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The publication of the 1982 version of Army Field Manual (FM)
100-5, Operations, introduced to the English-speaking world the
idea of an operational level of war encompassing the planning and
conduct of campaigns and major operations. It was followed 3 years
later by the introduction of the term "operational art" which was,
in practice, the skillful management of the operational level of
war. This conception of an identifiably separate level of war that
defined the jurisdiction of the profession of arms was, for a
number of historical and cultural reasons, attractive to U.S.
practitioners and plausible to its English-speaking allies. As a
result, it and its associated doctrine spread rapidly around the
world. The authors argue that as warfare continues to diffuse
across definitional and conceptual boundaries and as the close
orchestration of all of the instruments of national power becomes
even more important, the current conception of campaigns and
operations becomes crippling.
The publication of the 1982 version of Army Field Manual (FM)
100-5, Operations, introduced to the English-speaking world the
idea of an operational level of war which encompassed the planning
and conduct of campaigns and major operations. It was followed 3
years later by the introduction of the term "operational art" which
was, in practice, the skillful management of the operational level
of war. This conception of an identifiably separate level of war
that defined the jurisdiction of the profession of arms was, for a
number of historical and cultural reasons, attractive to U.S.
practitioners and plausible to its English-speaking allies. As a
result, it and its associated doctrine spread rapidly around the
world.
This monograph argues that the idea of an operational level of
war charged with the planning and conduct of campaigns misconceives
the relationship between wars, campaigns, and operations, and is
both historically mistaken and wrong in theory. Brigadier Justin
Kelly (Australian Army Retired) and Dr. Michael Brennan conclude
that its incorporation into U.S. doctrine has had the regrettable
impact of separating the conduct of campaigns from the conduct of
wars and consequently marginalized the role of politics in the
direction of war. In essence, they argue that the idea of the
campaign has come to overwhelm that of strategy.
This monograph argues that as warfare continues to diffuse
across definitional and conceptual boundaries and as the close
orchestration of all of the instruments of national power becomes
even more important, the current conception of campaigns and
operations becomes crippling. To cope with these demands by
formulating and prosecuting "national campaigns," the authors
propose that the responsibility for campaign design should
"actually" return to the political-strategic leadership of nations
supported by the entirety of the state bureaucracy. This would mark
the return of the campaign to its historical sources. If the United
States and its allies fail to make this change, they risk
continuing to have a "way of battle" rather than a "way of
war."
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